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Legislative Voting in Response to the EU Crisis
Jack Blumenau, University College London
Benjamin E. Lauderdale, London School of EconomicsThe European Union’s policy response to the recent global economic crisis transferred signiﬁcant powers from the
national to the European level. When exogenous shocks make status quo policies less attractive, legislators become
more tolerant to proposed alternatives, and the policy discretion of legislative agenda setters increases. Given control of
the EU agenda-setting process by pro-integration actors, we argue that this dynamic explains changes in voting patterns
of the European Parliament during the crisis period. We observe voting coalitions increasingly dividing legislators
along the pro-anti integration, rather than the left-right dimension of disagreement, but only in policy areas related to
the crisis. In line with more qualitative assessments of the content of passed legislation, the implication is that pro-
integration actors were able to shift policy further toward integration than they could have without the crisis.Crises are commonly assumed to be catalysts for po-litical action, opening “windows of opportunity” fordramatic and far-reaching reform (Cortell and Pe-
terson 1999; Keeler 1993; Kingdon 1995). Similarly, crises
can represent “critical junctures” that are central to expla-
nations of the punctuated dynamic of institutional change
(Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 2002; Col-
lier and Collier 2002; Krasner 1984; Peters et al. 2005; Pierson
2000; Thelen 2004). One way that crises can facilitate political
action is by weakening impediments that constrain agenda-
setting actors. When this happens, those agenda setters are
able to “make an opportunity out of a crisis” and secure
changes that would have been impossible previously. How-
ever, beyond broad arguments that impediments to political
action are removed, we often lack detailed theory of the ef-
fects that crises have on speciﬁc political decision-making
processes. Further, which actors beneﬁt from crises? Although
“policy entrepreneurs” are well positioned to beneﬁt from
crises (Kingdon 1995), it is important to specify why crises
represent “an opportunity to be exploited” (Keeler 1993, 441)
for some actors but not for others.We address these questions
by describing a model of the relationship between crises, leg-
islative voting behavior, and agenda setting, which we applyJack Blumenau (j.blumenau@lse.ac.uk) is a lecturer in the Department of Political Scien
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The model we describe implies that crises weaken a key
impediment to policy change: the opposition of legislators. This
provides microfoundations for the broader “crisis as opportu-
nity” thesis. Legislatures are a key part of the decision-making
apparatus of all democracies and act as a major constraint on
policy change under “normal” political conditions. There exist
few accounts of legislative behavior in times of crisis. In con-
trast, there is extensive work on the impact of exogenous shocks
on other political phenomena such as government duration
and termination (Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber 1986; Lupia
and Strøm 1995), ministerial turnover (Diermeier and Merlo
2000; Martinez-Gallardo 2011), policy change (Luong and
Weinthal 2004;Williams 2009), judicial decisions (Clark 2006;
Epstein et al. 2005), and public opinion (Aldrich et al. 2006;
Ladd 2007). Of the legislative studies that do evaluate the ef-
fects of such external shocks, there has been disproportionate
focus on the effects of war on voting behavior in the US
Congress (Cohen 1982; Howell and Rogowski 2013; Meernik
1993; Prins and Marshall 2001). This literature provides evi-
dence of the “rally round the ﬂag” effect but is largely silent on
the mechanisms that link crises to individual decisions madece, University College London. Benjamin Lauderdale (b.e.lauderdale@lse.ac.uk
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Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 463by legislators. Howell and Rogowski (2013, 164) encourage
scholars to “pay closer attention to the microfoundations of
legislative decisionmaking” in times of war, advice that clearly
applies more generally to crisis response. Additionally, while
existing accounts highlight the potentially destabilizing effects
of crises on policy, they do not generally provide speciﬁc pre-
dictions for the direction that policy will shift in response to
a crisis. For example, the institutionalist literature is unclear
as to what form new institutions will take following an equi-
libria punctuating shock. As Blyth (2002, 8) argues, “structural
theories of institutional supply are indeterminate as to sub-
sequent institutional form.”
Our argument applies the core insight of the agenda setting
model originally developed by Romer andRosenthal (1978) to
the context of a legislature facing a crisis in the face of pre-
existing multidimensional disagreements. By making the out-
comes resulting from inaction less attractive, crises strengthen
the position of agenda-setting actors in the policy process.
Crises can be understood as shocks to the external conditions
that frame legislative deliberations. In our model, legislators
have preferences over the ideological content of the bills that
they pass, but have a common interest in the extent to which
policy is well suited to current conditions—which we will call
the “valence” of policy. By changing the external context, a
crisis reveals deﬁciencies in existing policies, makes status quo
policies worse for all legislators, and thus encourages them to
accept replacements. Accordingly, agenda-setting actors have
more discretion during a crisis-period, and are able to propose
(and pass) policy that would have been impossible in the
absence of a crisis. When standing political disagreements are
multidimensional, we show that such amodel implies changes
in legislative voting coalitions. Such shifts not only provide
evidence that policy is moving toward the agenda setter’s po-
sition but can also constitute a realignment of the primary
dimension of political disagreement.
This model is well suited to understanding the effects of
the global ﬁnancial crisis on the voting behavior in the
European Parliament (EP), where politics has traditionally
operated in two dimensions: left-right and pro-anti integra-
tion (Hix 2002; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006, 2007; Høyland
2010; Kreppel 2000; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). We argue
that, in the context of the crisis, members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) became more tolerant toward policies
that they might previously have opposed; pro-integration
agenda setters (the EuropeanCommission, the Council of the
European Union, and the leaders of the large European Par-
liamentary Groups [EPGs]) exploited this tolerance to pass
highly integrationist policy. Following the logic of our the-
oretical argument, this should have led to a shift in the voting
patterns of the legislature, with voting coalitions increasinglyThis content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms dividing legislators into pro versus anti integration coalitions
rather than left versus right coalitions.
We provide evidence that this occurred by combining
topic modeling with a two-stage least-squares procedure in
order to construct synthetic control comparisons to legisla-
tion in the precrisis period. We show that there was a shift
toward voting along the pro-anti integration dimension
during the crisis period but only on crisis-related issues. The
crisis did not occasion the sort of shift toward integrationist
policy that might have resulted if the crisis simply made
MEPs more favorable toward integration in general: changes
were conﬁned to the crisis-related policy areas where status
quo policies were increasingly viewed as untenable.
The EU policy response to the crisis was dramatic and
far-reaching, and while some attention has been paid to the
crisis response of the Commission (Copeland and James 2014)
and the national governments in the European Council (Schim-
melfennig 2014; Tsebelis and Hahm 2014), the only research
of which we are aware that investigates how the crisis af-
fected MEP votes focuses on the cohesion of EPGs and is
based on a limited number of roll-call votes (Braghiroli 2015).
While we are not the ﬁrst to observe that the Commission and
the Council were strengthened vis-à-vis other actors during
the crisis, our argument attributes this change to how the crisis
weakened the Parliament’s ability to block policy changes.
That the Commission and the Council appeared to be the
central actors in the EU policy response is not the entire story:
it was the crisis itself that undermined the Parliament’s ability
to stand in the way.
POLITICS OF CRISIS IN THE EU
Background
In order to evaluate the effects of the crisis on the behavior
of MEPs and on the agenda of the European Parliament, we
ﬁrst discuss two stylized facts supported by past research on
EP politics that constitute key assumptions of our analysis.
The ﬁrst stylized fact is that policy preferences in the Eu-
ropean Parliament can be described in terms of two major
dimensions. One dimension corresponds to the left-right
issues that typically shape national-level politics, while the
second dimension relates to the scope of authority of Eu-
ropean institutions, with those favouring more European
powers at one end and those opposing the expansion of these
powers at the other. This structure manifests itself clearly in
roll-call (Hix et al. 2006, 2007; Hix and Noury 2009; Høyland
2010; Klüver and Spoon 2015) and expert survey (McElroy
and Benoit 2007, 2011) data. The distribution of European
Party Group (EPG) positions over these two dimensions are
an inverted-U shape, where centrist parties (on the left-right
dimension) tend to have relatively strong pro-integration41.061.032 on June 26, 2018 06:41:13 AM
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right space tend to be more anti-integrationist.1
The second stylized fact is that although agenda control
in the European Union is diffuse (Hix and Hoyland 2011), the
main agenda-setting actors—the European Commission, the
Parliament’s Conference of Presidents, and the European
Council—are united by their pro-integrationpreferences. The
European Commission—a supranational body appointed by
the governments of EU member states—holds the exclusive
right to legislative initiative within the European Union. The
Commission is the ultimate external gatekeeper in the EU-
wide policy process (Hix et al. 2007, 111), and recent litera-
ture has emphasized the key role of the Commission as agenda
setter during the crisis period (Copeland and James 2014).
The Commission is usually assumed to be pro-integration
(Hooghe 2005; Mattila 2004; Tsebelis and Kreppel 1998) and
has generally proved to be so in matters relating to the eco-
nomic crisis.
The internal agenda of the parliament is largely controlled
by the leaders of the EPGs through the Conference of Pres-
idents, a political body responsible for the organization of
parliamentary business (Kreppel 2002, 210). Through the Con-
ference, party group leaders determine the agenda for plenary
sessions, and a voting system that is weighted by party size
allows the larger party groups—such as the EPP, ALDE, and
the S&D2—to dominate the process. The large parties also
hold the vast majority of lower-level agenda-setting ofﬁces—
such as committee seats, chairs, and rapporteurships—which
are also distributed according to party group size. Thus, in the
internal agenda-setting process of the Parliament, the large
party groups are dominant and have signiﬁcant abilities to
restrict the ﬂow of legislative trafﬁc. These parties are centrist
on the ﬁrst dimension and distinctly pro-integration on the
second dimension of conﬂict (see ﬁg. 2).
Leaders of national governments also have the ability to
exercise agenda-setting powers. In addition to agreeing inter-
governmental treaties betweenEU states, national governments
also play a role in guiding the ordinary legislative process of
EU policymaking. For example, the European Council, which
is made up of the leaders of national governments, is respon-
sible for setting the “general political direction and priorities”
of the Union (European Union 2007). Similarly, Schmidt
(2001) argues that the Council ofMinisters, which is composed
of government ministers from each member state, has sig-
niﬁcant informal inﬂuence over the shape of policies proposed1. Figure 2 presents the expert survey located positions of the EPGs on
these two dimensions for the seventh European Parliament (2009–14).
2. European People’s Party; Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe; Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.
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the agenda-setting process is opaque, it is clear that they have
some bearing on which issues arise on the legislative agenda.
AsWarntjen, Hix, and Crombez (2008) show, preferences for
integration in the Council have been positive and stable across
a long time period.
Relative to these agenda-setting actors in the Parliament,
Commission and Council, the median MEP is more Euroscep-
tic. Not only are there explicitly anti-integration party groups,
but even the centrist EPGs are “far more pro-European than
their constituent national parties” (McElroy and Benoit 2011,
163), which makes legislative support for integration within
these groups far from guaranteed.3
Crisis
Europe suffered twomajor waves of economic crisis between
2007 and the present. First, the collapse of the US subprime
mortgage market sparked a global ﬁnancial crisis that caused
major difﬁculties for European banks (Brunnermeier 2009).
Second, in 2010, that banking crisis evolved into a sovereign
debt crisis, as market fears spread that national governments
would be unable to meet their guarantees to failing banks
(Lane 2012). These crises were extraordinarily damaging for
EU countries, causing large declines in gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), foreign direct investment, global exports and com-
modity prices, and dramatic increases in unemployment. There
was also considerable deterioration in the public ﬁnances of
EU national governments, with several countries brought to
the brink of sovereign default and forced to rely on bailouts
from their European neighbors (Paulo 2011).
These crises demonstrated that EU economic policies and
institutions, constructed in an extended period of growth,
were ill suited to times of economic turmoil. For example, the
banking crisis revealed that European banks, which had be-
come large and overleveraged, represented a more signiﬁcant
risk to the stability of the ﬁnancial system than was previously
understood (Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 2011; Alessandri
and Haldane 2009). Furthermore, the precrisis regulatory frame-
work was shown to be incapable of coping with the systemic
nature of the crisis, providing no tools to respond to the
collapse of large international banks (European Commission
2013). As the crisis spread, MEPs were quick to notice the
deﬁciencies in existing regulation.4 Similarly, the debt crisis3. In the speciﬁc context of the crisis response Braghiroli (2015, 100)
suggests that “the EP’s stance on the crisis can hardly be deﬁned as unitary.”
4. In a debate following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a prominent
member of the EP argued that “the supervision of the ﬁnancial markets is
not working . . . the status quo is untenable in the medium and long term.”
Joesph Daul, EPP MEP, October 8, 2008.
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below, and in app. sec. A9.
7. See, e.g., Adams et al. (2011), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000),
Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 465revealed structural problems with the design of the currency
union as a whole. Existing policy to contain imbalances in
public debt and current account deﬁcits between Eurozone
countries had proven inadequate, as the main rules to en-
courage ﬁscal coordination and discipline—enshrined in the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)—had been consistently
broken (ECB 2011; Holinski, Kool, and Muysken 2012; Lane
2012). In the positive economic conditions in which the SGP
was formed, governments were able to fund excessive budget
deﬁcits relatively cheaply, by borrowing from the international
bond markets (De Grauwe 2011). However, as the crisis hit,
and these markets dried up, the sustainability of these policies
was called into question. As one MEP argued: “The economic
and ﬁnancial crisis has revealed all too clearly the shortcom-
ings and weaknesses of the existing instruments and methods
for coordinating economic and currency policy.”5
Theory
Our theoretical model of how the crisis inﬂuenced voting in
the European Parliament starts from this observation that
the crisis dramatically reduced the attractiveness of existing
status quo policies to legislators and opened a window of
opportunity for economic policy change. When voting on
policies, legislators operate in speciﬁc economic and polit-
ical contexts that inform their perception of different policy
options, and they prefer to select alternatives that are well
suited to current conditions. At the time of adoption, policy
will be written to “ﬁt” the external circumstances relatively
well, but policy is static and can only be changed with fur-
ther legislative effort. External circumstances, by contrast,
are dynamic and undergo exogenous changes so that as
time passes the degree to which a given policy remains ef-
fective may decline. In normal times, slowly changing ex-
ternal circumstances open up only limited opportunities to
overcome coalitions opposed to policy change. A crisis con-
stitutes a dramatic change to external conditions which leads
to a large decrease in the efﬁcacy of extant policy. This makes
legislators much more inclined to accept alternatives to the
status quo, which (in expectation) will be better suited to the
changed environment.
The form that these alternative policies take depends on
which actors control the agenda-setting process. Actors
who monopolize proposal power are able to exploit the fact
that the status quo has become unpopular in order to pass
policy that previously would have failed to secure a ma-
jority. Romer and Rosenthal (1978) show that agenda set-
ters with the ability to make take-it-or-leave-it offers can
exploit situations in which the status quo is unattractive.5. Richard Seeber, EPP MEP, October 20, 2010.
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sequently, the greater the gain to the setter from being able
to propose the alternative” (Romer and Rosenthal 1978, 35–
36). In the Romer andRosenthalmodel a status quo is “worse”
when it is in an extreme position in the policy space, and
others have considered the effects of an exogenous shock to
the spatial position of the status quo (Tsebelis 2002). How-
ever, for modeling a political crisis, we believe it makes more
sense to think of the status quo as worse in nonspatial terms.
A crisis entails a sudden change to the external conditions in
which existing policies operate, rather than an exogenous
change to the extent to which those policies are on the po-
litical left or right, or the extent to which they are integra-
tionist or not. We therefore build on these previous models
by modeling a crisis not as an exogenous shift in the position
of existing policy but rather as a nonspatial shock to the
status quo.6
To motivate this nonspatial conceptualization of a crisis,
consider the example of a typical US state with constitutional
requirement to balance its budget each year. The United
States enters recession, creating a shortfall in the state bud-
get, which is a situation where the current bundle of taxation
and spending policies are poorly suited to the new economic
environment as they would lead to a government shutdown.
The legislators then face a range of choices that would avert
this bad outcome: they could move policy to the right by pri-
marily or exclusively reducing services, to the left by primar-
ily or exclusively increasing taxes, or keep it where it is with
some balance of the two. Legislators agree that current levels
of taxation and spending no longer “ﬁt” the conditions, but
they disagree over the appropriate policy response. In such a
situation, all legislators will be more willing (to a degree de-
pendent on how much they want to avoid a shutdown) to
tolerate deviations from their ideal tax and spend policies in
order to replace the untenable status quo. Existing policy is
not itself affected by the crisis in a left-right spatial sense: it is
the same policy it was before the crisis.
Here we will use the widely used term “valence” to refer
to this nonspatial quality of policy. In models of elections,
valence is understood to reﬂect voters’ preferences for uni-
versally valued candidate characteristics such as integrity,
competence, and ability to provide local public goods.7 In
our model, valence is the degree to which policy is well suited
to external conditions and can be alternatively understood asAshworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), Enelow and Hinich (1982), and
Groseclose (2001).
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there is universal agreement.8 In our empirical analysis we
exploit the fact that only certain status quo policies are af-
fected by the crisis in order to identify changes in legislative
behavior between crisis and noncrisis periods.
Combining this understanding of crisis politics with the
general preference structure of the European Parliament
leads us to consider a model where legislators have pref-
erences over locations in two general policy dimensions, x1
and x2, and also prefer policies with higher valence v.9 This
yields quadratic-loss random utility functions for the pro-
posal and alternative:
uiq p 2(xi1 2 xq1)
2 2 (xi2 2 xq2)
2 1 vq 1 eiq ; ð1Þ
uip p 2(xi1 2 xp1)
2 2 (xi2 2 xp2)
2 1 vp 1 eip ; ð2Þ
where we deﬁne the valence terms as follows:
vp p 0 ; ð3Þ
vq

p 0 absent a crisis
! 0 during a crisis
ð4Þð5Þ
In the absence of a crisis, the valence of the status quo and the
valence of new policy are equal (vp p vq). A negative “shock”
to the valence of the status quo occurs when a crisis dra-
matically changes external conditions, resulting in a smaller
value of vq such that, in expectation, vp 1 vq. As legislators
preferences over valence are identical, this formulation cap-
tures the central intuition: shocks to the valence dimension
are painful for everyone. The crisis negatively affects legisla-
tors evaluations of the status quo, regardless of their ideo-
logical disagreements on other spatial dimensions.
Example cases of voting under these utilities are depicted
in ﬁgure 1. Consider a situation where there is no valence
gap between the status quo and the proposal (ﬁg. 1A, vq p
vp). Absent a crisis, voting accords to a simple spatial model.
Legislators vote “yea” ’ if their own ideal point is closer to the
proposal (p) than it is to the status quo (q) and “nay” other-
wise. The dashed cutline separates “yeas” from “nays.” The
ð4Þ
ð5Þ8. Thus, a valence shock can be alternatively understood as a shock to
the spatial position of the status quo that moves policy to a position far
outside the range of legislator preferences on this additional dimension,
see app. sec. A2 for a derivation showing these models are equivalent.
9. In app. sec. A3 we generalize the analysis by considering a “1D plus
valence” model that also captures the central intuition that agenda-setters
secure more preferable policy outcomes during a crisis. However, in addition
to being a poor match to EP politics, the 1D model predicts that voting
coalitions remain unchanged while the policy proposal positions change
between crisis and noncrisis periods. The former are farmore easily measured
than the latter.
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policies that would defeat the status quo in pairwise com-
parison. Policies located within the winset will defeat q in
an up-or-down vote, and policies located outside the winset
will fail. The proposal p is determined by the agenda setter
(AS), who makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal that is as close
as possible to her own ideal point, within the constraint that
the policy will be approved by a majority vote (i.e., within the
winset).
Here, the agenda setter is located at a relatively moderate
position on the ﬁrst dimension but an extreme positive
position in the second dimension, so the proposal is close to
the top of the winset. Given the illustrative winset shown,
the proposal mostly moves policy from left to right, rather
than south to north. Because of this, the cutline falls nearly
vertically, and the “yea” coalition is formed of legislators on
the right side of the policy space.
Consider now the crisis case (vq ! vp), where we tempo-
rarily hold ﬁxed the positions of q and p (ﬁg. 1B). The main
implication of the decline in vq is that any given legislator is
willing to accept a broader range of policies because the
ideological cost of accepting a more distant p is compensated
for by replacing the low-valence q. The decline in vq therefore
leads some legislators to vote for p despite their relative
proximity to q, resulting in a larger coalition of support for p
during the crisis. This is depicted by the leftward shift of the
cutline. If the proposed policy p is held ﬁxed, a crisis will lead
to a larger “yea” coalition than in the noncrisis period.
However, because more policies are able to defeat q (the
winset expands), the agenda setter can propose a policy closer
to her own ideal point that will still win a majority of support.
This means that the agenda setter can propose p0 instead of p
(ﬁg. 1C). As p0 is within the enlarged winset it is approved by
the legislature, whereas in the equal valence scenario it would
have been rejected, and the agenda setter obtains a policy
outcome that would not have been possible in the absence of
the crisis. These ﬁgures make clear the agenda setter’s ad-
vantage during crisis periods. The worse a valence shock (i.e.,
the lower vq), the larger the winset grows, and thus the more
discretion the agenda setter has over policy.
Predictions: Policy response
The ﬁrst implication of the model is that agenda setters will
propose and obtain policies closer to their ideal points during
crises. Legislators take the broader policy-making environ-
ment into account when deciding on policy, and while always10. Analytically deriving thewinset is not possible without ﬁrst specifying
the 2D preference distribution of legislators. However, an illustrative version
is sufﬁcient for our purposes here.
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nonspatial shocks result in equivalent observable implications, and dem-
onstrate that it is not necessary to accept the “valence-shock” aspect of our
model in order to accept most of our argument as to how crises empower
agenda setters.
Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 467sensitive to deviations from their own policy preferences, they
are also concerned with adopting policies that are congruent
with current conditions. This means that when crises cause
sudden changes in the external environment, existing policies
(the status quo) become less attractive and make legislators
more receptive to alternative proposals. The model therefore
provides microfoundations for the idea that crises represent
“an opportunity to be exploited” by agenda-setting actors.
Our decision to model crises as a nonspatial valence shock
distinguishes our argument from other plausible mechanisms
that could link a crisis to changes in legislative behavior. First,
one could model an exogenous shock as a sudden movement
of the status quo in the policy space (Tsebelis 2002). Second,
one might also model the effects of a crisis as an exogenous
shift in the preferences of legislators. The key difference be-
tween these models of crisis and our valence-shock model is
that in the latter, the worse the valence of the status quo, theThis content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms greater the discretion of the agenda setter to move policy in
any direction. This contrasts with modeling a crisis as a spatial
shock—either to preferences or to the position of the status
quo—where the winset expands in directions determined by
the direction of the shock, meaning that agenda setters beneﬁt
only under certain conditions. We prefer to conceptualize a
political crisis as a nonspatial shock because this better ap-
proximates our intuitive understanding of a crisis: whereas
spatial shocks imply that some actors prefer the crisis, non-
spatial exogenous shocks make the status quo worse for ev-
eryone.11Figure 1. Crises, legislative voting, and agenda setting in two dimensions. A, In the absence of a crisis, voting collapses to a simple spatial model, with
legislators voting for the proposal p if they are to the right of the cutline, or against the proposal otherwise. B, If the status quo q receives a negative valence
shock, but the proposed policy is ﬁxed at p, then the cutline will shift to the left, indicating that some legislators who previously would have voted against p,
now would vote “yea.” C, In equilibrium, the agenda-setting actor (AS) will exploit this tolerance to propose policy (p0) that better represents her interests.
The agenda setter “makes an opportunity out of the crisis.” We can identify the effects of such a proposal in two-dimensional voting patterns, as the cutline
rotates in the direction of the ideal point of the agenda setter.41.061.032 on June 26, 2018 06:41:13 AM
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13. We note that the European Parliament did not play a central role in
all parts of the EU’s crisis response. For example, the Parliament was not
required to approve the “Fiscal Compact,” a high proﬁle treaty which intro-
468 / Never Let a Good Crisis Go to Waste Jack Blumenau and Benjamin E. LauderdaleIn the context of the European Union, the model implies
that a relatively wide range of policy options could plau-
sibly have won majority support in the European Parlia-
ment during the crisis period, as MEPs should have been
willing to make ideological compromises in order to replace
defunct policy. Although the policies adopted during the
crisis had a distinctive ideological proﬁle, two broad policy
responses, which proposed opposing shifts along the inte-
gration dimension, were in fact discussed. Pro-integrationist
actors argued for the integration of banking regulation, the
creation of new EU ﬁnancial oversight institutions, and fur-
ther empowerment of existing institutions to enforce ﬁscal
discipline on member states. Proponents of this integra-
tionist response included the European Commission presi-
dent, José Manuel Barroso, who argued that the EU response
to the crisis “must be far reaching reform. . . . Europe’s con-
tribution must be a big step for an ever closer, ever stronger
Union” (Barroso 2013). An alternate policy response, sup-
ported largely by Eurosceptic actors, focused on streamlining
the European institutions to make themmore competitive, safe-
guarding national regulatory powers, and “repatriating” powers
from Brussels back to the national level. British Prime Min-
ister David Cameron made this argument in 2013 by empha-
sizing that future EU reforms ought not to include “an insis-
tence on a one size ﬁts all approach which implies that all
countries want the same level of integration. The fact is that
they don’t and we shouldn’t assert that they do” (Cameron
2013). Overall, while the crisis led to dissatisfaction with the
status quo across the political spectrum, there was substantial
disagreement about the ideal strategy for resolving deﬁcient
policy, disagreement that largely reﬂected the preexisting
dimensions of disagreement over EU integration.
This alternate policy response never reached the ﬂoor of the
European Parliament because agenda setters in the European
Parliament are uniformly pro-integration.12 It is unambiguous
that integrationist legislation passed during this period. The
legislative response to the ﬁnancial crisis included many pol-12. That the main agenda-setters worked together to propose integra-
tionist responses to the crisis is clear from the parliamentary debates of the
period. For example, in a parliamentary debate on the “six-pack,” András
Kármán emphasized that both the European Commission and the leaders of
national governments were united by a desire to reform the economic gov-
ernance of the EU: “It was not the individual decision of the Presidency to
designate this ﬁle as the top priority. The Commission’s initiative has also
been supported by the Heads of State and Government of the 27 Member
States.” (Kármán 2011) Similarly, the rapporteur for the proposal to establish
new European institutions for ﬁnancial supervision highlighted the consensus
among the mainstream EPG leaders: “Parliament is ﬁrmly committed, po-
litically committed, to European supervision, and I believe that there is great
consensus on this among all political groupings” (de Vigo 2010).
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms icies that transferred signiﬁcant powers from the national to
the European level. The EuropeanUnion instigated amajor set
of banking reforms, including: a common rulebook for
banking practice; the establishment of a Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) for the oversight of risk in the banking
system; a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which makes
Eurozone governments jointly responsible for the solvency of
private banks; and a host of new institutions that aim to limit
systemic risk. The European Commission acquired dramati-
cally increased powers under the new ﬁscal framework, the
harmonization of banking standards directly affects national
law, and the new institutions can be seen as quasi-federal
supervisory authorities (Lannoo 2011, 2).
The response to the debt crisis was perhaps even more in-
tegrationist. Themost high-proﬁle changes included legislation
to increase theCommission’s ability to scrutinizemember-state
ﬁnances; a legislative “six pack,” which bolsters the Stability
andGrowth Pact by establishing ﬁscal goals to whichmember-
states must converge; and the creation of the European Sta-
bility Mechanism (ESM), a permanent rescue facility for the
Eurozone area. Again, these reforms entail a signiﬁcant deep-
ening of integration in economic affairs, empowering supra-
national actors such as the Commission and the European
Central Bank, and transferring sensitive policy competences to
the European level. In sum, integrationist policies relating to
sovereign ﬁnances, macroeconomic coordination and bank-
ing reform were proposed by the European Commission and
were adopted by legislators in the European Parliament.13
Predictions: Voting coalitions
If our theoretical model captures the dynamics of the EU
case, there is a second implication, which concerns how vot-duced stricter budgetary surveillance and discipline within the eurozone area.
As Tsebelis and Hahm (2014) suggest, the mechanism through which this
treaty was adopted can be explained by reference to the changing dimen-
sionality of the policy space between disagreeing member states, rather than a
shift to the dimensions of contestation in the Parliament. Nevertheless, a great
deal of important crisis-related legislation required passage under the ordi-
nary legislative (codecision) procedure in which the Parliament acts as a full
co-legislator with the Council. For example, the “six pack,” “two pack,” and
the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Banking Au-
thority (EBA) were all dealt with under the codecision procedure. Although
the Fiscal Compact was certainly an important element to the crisis-response,
it would have been largely ineffective without these extensive reforms to the
EU’s economic governance architecture. These were major integrating mea-
sures that the EP could have blocked, and our argument addresses why the EP
did not do so.
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ought to have changed in response to a crisis. The main ob-
servable implication of the model is apparent in ﬁgure 1C,
where the cutline separating the “yea” from the “nay” voters
rotates after the valence shock to become closer to horizontal.
The more “northerly” the policy proposal relative to the status
quo, the more legislators will vote based on their preferences
regarding the second dimension rather than the ﬁrst, leading
to a more horizontal cutline between the voting coalitions.
Extending this logic to the general case, because a crisis en-
ables the agenda setter to move policy toward her ideal point
to a greater degree, the dimension of observed political dis-
agreement will shift toward the dimension along which the
agenda setter differs most from the typical legislator.14
As the preference structure of the European Parliament and
the location of agenda-setting actors in the preferences space
reﬂects the theoretical structure we previously used to illustrate
our model in ﬁgure 1, we expect a similar rotation of the cut-
lines in the European Parliament in response to the ﬁnancial
crisis. If agenda setters proposed more pro-integration policy
solutions, the cutlines separating voting coalitions should have
been increasingly horizontal, dividing pro- and anti-European
MEPs, rather than vertical, dividing right and left MEPs.15
We are therefore interested in assessing the degree to which
the cutlines of crisis-related EP votes tend toward horizontal.
We denote the angle of the cutline of a vote as φj, and deﬁne
this angle over an arc of 2p such that it equals zero when the
cutline is horizontal.16 Figure 2 gives a graphical depiction of14. Our expectations regarding the change to voting coalitions that result
from a valence shock rely on the assumption that individual legislators vote
spatially, and are not subject to signiﬁcant party discipline. This is reasonable
in the case of the EP, where party discipline is notoriously weak. If party
discipline were stronger and parties voted spatially, the same logic would
apply but at the level of parties rather than individual legislators.
15. One possible objection is that the “take-it-or-leave-it” agenda power
assumed by our model is unrealistic in the EP, where ﬂoor amendments are
permissible. If amendments can be used to rein in proposals that are too
integrationist, while still replacing the status quo with a higher valence pro-
posal, then pro-integration agenda setters would not proﬁt from increased
discretion during a crisis. However, evidence strongly suggests that amend-
ments tend to change policy on the left-right dimension of conﬂict but not
the integrationist dimension (Hix et al. 2007; Kreppel 2000; Kreppel and Hix
2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). There are technical limitations to pro-
posing such amendments, as doing so would require legislators to propose
fundamentally reformed institutional structures. This would require signiﬁ-
cant legislative resources, expertise, and drafting time. The anti-integrationist
party groups (the actors with an incentive to propose such amendments)
are resource-poor in comparison with the larger groups and the European
Commission. Thus, in the context of the EP, it is unlikely that the power of
agenda setters is signiﬁcantly diminished by the availability of amendments.
16. We formally derive the relationship between the cutline angle and
the extent to which policy is moving in the second relative to the ﬁrst
dimension in the supporting information.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms different values for φ. In the top-left quadrant, when φp 0,
the coalition of yes voters is pro-integration. The top-right
and bottom-left quadrants demonstrate the necessity for the
deﬁnition of φ over an arc of 2p. In both cases, the cutline is
vertical, separating left-wing from right-wing voters, but
when φp p=2, the right-wing voters are voting for the vote,
and the left-wing voters are voting against. By contrast, when
φp 2p=2, it is the left coalition that is on the yes side of the
vote. The ﬁnal quadrant shows the cutline (with φp p=4)
where the yes coalition is pro-integration but right-leaning.
In terms of φj, we can characterize the average tendency
of coalitions to align with yes votes among pro-integration
MEPs using the mean absolute angular deviation (MAAD)
from zero:
MAADp
1
M
o
M
jp1
jφjj : ð6Þ
The closer to zero the MAAD is, the greater the tendency of
votes to have yes voters among pro-integration MEPs and no
voters among anti-integration MEPs (of both left and right).
Our argument suggests that when a crisis occurs, the va-
lence of existing policy will decline, leading to more integra-
tionist policy proposals, and a shift in the distribution of the
cutlines. However, crucial to our argument is that we only ex-
pect MAAD to decline in policy areas that are affected by the
crisis. Our argument is policy-domain speciﬁc, as it is only
status quo policies in crisis-related areas that will receive a
valence shock, and so only in votes on these issues that we
expect to observe a rotation of cutlines. This yields a testable
prediction that has the formof a differences-in-differences: we
expect that after the onset of the crisis, cutlines will shift to-
ward horizontal in crisis-relevant policy areas relative to non-
crisis-relevant policy areas.DATA AND METHODS
Our theoretical model, as applied to the European Parliament,
has implications for the voting behavior we observe during the
crisis relative to the counterfactual voting behavior we would
have observed absent the crisis. Since we cannot observeMEPs’
votes in the absence of the crisis, the task of our empirical
analysis is to construct the most plausible estimate we can of
the counterfactual. We do this by using legislative summary
texts to identify legislation in the precrisis period that addresses
the same legislative topics as the legislation that we can observe
is crisis related in the crisis period. Once we have constructed
the synthetic control group of comparable legislation, we can
compare voting patterns in the precrisis and post-crisis period
on legislation that is as similar as possible in the issues it
addresses.41.061.032 on June 26, 2018 06:41:13 AM
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We collect voting records for legislators in the European
Parliament from www.votewatch.eu, which documents every
recorded vote in the EP.We collect all votes from the sixth and
seventh European Parliaments (2004–14), therefore including
a period before and after the emergence of the crisis. In order
to make estimated cutlines for EP6 and EP7 comparable, it is
necessary to jointly estimate preferences over both parlia-
ments. We combine the roll-call votes taken in EP6 and EP7,
holding the preferences of individual MEPs serving in both
constant. To ensure that we can distinguish left-right political
preferences from pro-anti integration preferences, it is nec-
essary to use some kind of auxiliary information to orient the
latent preference space along those axes. To identify these
dimensions, we implement a hierarchical 2D ideal point es-
timator in Stan (Stan Development Team 2014) using expertThis content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms survey data (McElroy and Benoit 2011) to locate the average
positions of party groups in EP6 and EP7. These locations
form priors over the average positions of MEPs in each of the
two dimensions, with the party group priors for both EP6
and EP7 informing the priors of MEPs who served in both
Parliaments. For further details of the ideal point estimation
and the derivation of how the cut angles φj are calculated
from the estimates, see section A4 of the appendix, available
online.Identifying crisis-relevant and non-crisis-
relevant votes
Our model implies that there will be a difference in the dis-
tribution of the φj between votes that relate to the crisis and
votes that do not. We therefore require a method for distin-Figure 2. Voting coalitions for different values of φ. The model we present predicts that more votes will result in a situation similar to the top-left quadrant,
where φp 0 and the coalition is pro-integration, in the post-crisis period.41.061.032 on June 26, 2018 06:41:13 AM
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To begin, for each vote we collect a legislative summary text
from the EP website.18 The summaries give a synopsis of the
purpose, background, and content of legislation under discus-
sion and thus provide salient textual information for clas-
siﬁcation.19 An example text is provided in the appendix
(sec. A1). We search the EP7 summaries for the presence or
absence of ﬁve key phrases that indicate direct relevance to the
crisis: “ﬁnancial crisis,” “economic crisis,” “sovereign debt cri-
sis,” “euro crisis,” and “Eurozone crisis.” This search returns a
binary classiﬁcation of the “crisis relevance” of a vote, and of
the 6,916 votes held during EP7, our selection procedure
codes 1,071 as “crisis-relevant.”
In accordance with our theoretical model, votes in EP7
identiﬁed as crisis-relevant by this key phrase coding were
marked by signiﬁcantly (t p 26:8, assuming independence)
and substantially (about 18%) lower values of MAAD than
non-crisis-relevant votes during the same period. That is,
during the crisis period, broadly deﬁned as the entirety of
EP7, votes on crisis-relevant legislation divided MEPs more
along pro-anti lines than did votes on non-crisis-relevant leg-
islation. However, this difference between crisis-relevant and
non-crisis-relevant votes in EP7 may reﬂect a preexisting fea-
ture of EP disagreement across different policy domains. Are
these differences in voting patterns part of the preexisting
structure of voting on economic and ﬁnance versus other
issues, or a change in voting structure that resulted from the
crisis?17. One approachwould be to classify votes according to their committee
of origin so that, e.g., votes on reports originating from the Economic and
Monetary Affairs (ECON) committee could be crisis-relevant, and all other
votes nonrelevant. However, relying on a simple committee categorization is
problematic. ECON reports include a diverse selection of legislation, only
some of which pertain to the crisis. Similarly, many explicitly crisis-related
reports did not originate in the ECON committee. For example, an important
parliamentary resolution concerning the feasibility of stability bonds (or
“Eurobonds”) did not originate in the ECON committee. Such an approach
would yield a coding that, at best, only roughly approximated our classiﬁ-
cation of interest. Another approach would be to manually code votes from
EP6 and EP7 that we deem to be crisis related; however, this would require a
great deal of subjective judgement and require coding many thousands of
votes.
18. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu.
19. We opt for the legislative summaries—rather than, e.g., debates or
the texts of the proposals themselves—because they are relatively short
(the median number of words in each text is 789), and are tightly focused
on the topical content of the legislation. While other texts would likely
recover a similar classiﬁcation, legislative speeches would contain con-
siderably more noise than the summaries do, and the clauses of the bills
are likely to contain a large proportion of legislative jargon which would
be common across bills and would not help us to discriminate between
crisis-related and non-crisis-related votes.
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tual: what voting would have looked like in EP7 in the absence
of a crisis. Therefore, in order to synthesize themost plausible,
feasible control group, we look to the preceding European
Parliament, where voting coalitions were not subject to the
crisis effects that our model contemplates. However, we can-
not simply search for mentions of the crisis in EP6 legislative
summaries because the crisis had not yet occurred. Instead,
we need to identify votes from EP6 that are substantively
similar to the crisis-relevant votes we have already identiﬁed
in EP7. To classify the full set of votes, we develop a novel text
classiﬁcation strategy to estimate the degree to which precrisis
votes were “crisis-relevant” so that we can make a fair com-
parison of votes pre- versus post-crisis. To do this, we train a
linear probability classiﬁcation of EP6 votes using the binary
classiﬁcation of EP7 votes described above as the training data
for a model that predicts crisis-relatedness using features of
legislative summary texts. The intuition behind our estima-
tion strategy is to use the information contained in the leg-
islative summaries to ﬁnd votes in EP6 that are about sub-
stantively similar issues to the crisis-related votes in EP7 and
to use these votes to compare voting coalitions on these issues
across the crisis and noncrisis periods.20
We begin by estimating topic models (Blei and Lafferty
2006; Roberts et al. 2014) on the corpus of legislative sum-
maries covering every vote in EP6 and EP7. The key quan-
tity of interest recovered from each of these topic models
is a matrix of topic proportions that describes the fraction
of each legislative summary d ∈ f1; 2; ::: ;Dg that is from
each topic t ∈ (1; 2; ::: ;T). These matrixes offer a high-
dimensional summary of the substantive content of each vote
and give us a basis on which to ﬁnd thematically similar votes
in EP6 and EP7. We then use the topic proportions for the
EP7 votes as explanatory variables in “ﬁrst-stage” linear re-
gressions, where the dependent variable is themanually coded
“crisis-relevant” binary classiﬁcation introduced above.We use
the estimated coefﬁcients to generate ﬁtted values, denoted
p^j(kd), for all votes in both EP6 and EP7. These values rep-
resent the probability that each vote j is crisis-relevant, given
the vector of topic proportions for legislative summary d from
topic model k. The intuition is that the regression coefﬁcients
on the topic proportions indicate the thematic elements (the
word usage typical of a topic) that predict a vote being crisis-
relevant, and the ﬁtted values thus provide a measure for
whether the issues addressed in each vote from both EP6 and
EP7 were ultimately relevant to the crisis.20. We give further detail on the construction of our approach in
app. sec. A10.
41.061.032 on June 26, 2018 06:41:13 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
472 / Never Let a Good Crisis Go to Waste Jack Blumenau and Benjamin E. LauderdaleThe above exercise can be completed for topic models with
any number of topics or, indeed, using any of the wide variety
of topic models that have been developed. Choosing the ap-
propriate number of topics is a common problem in topic
modeling, and typical solutions (e.g., Blei, Ng, and Jordan
2003) aim to ﬁnd themodel that best predicts held-out textual
data. In our case, we are not interested in predicting text data
out of sample but rather in predicting our EP7 classiﬁcation of
“crisis-relevant” votes. Thus, we ﬁt all K p 98 integer topic
counts from 3 to 100 and then use several approaches to
assess which yields the most predictive ﬁrst-stage regression
for crisis-related votes in EP7. For each of the ﬁrst-stage
regressions, we calculate BIC, AIC, and adjusted R2. AIC and
adjusted R2 agree on the 62-topic model, while BIC (which
includes a greater penalty for additional parameters) favors
the 29-topic model (the second-best model under AIC and
adjusted R2).21
To complement thismodel selection based on ﬁt to the EP7
summaries, we have also compared the model based predic-
tions of whether an EP6 summary is crisis-related to human
judgements of crisis relatedness for a hand-coded random
subset of 200 summaries, coded by both authors. The goal of
this exercise is to establishwhether the text based classiﬁcation
of EP6 summaries correlates with human judgments of the
types of issues that were likely to become pertinent to the crisis
once it began. We provide full details of this validation exer-
cise in the appendix (sec. A6), however it indicates that topic
models with 20–40 topics tend to yield estimates of crisis-
relatedness that are more highly associated with human cod-
ing than thosewith higher topic counts. This is consistent with
more general results on human validation of topic models
(Chang et al. 2009). Therefore, we proceed in this paper with
the 29-topic model and present the (similar) results using the
62-topic and other models in the appendix.
Before turning to our main results, we assess the face
validity of our procedure. Our primary concern is obtaining
good estimates for which EP6 votes were in policy areas that
were to become relevant to the crisis once it arrived. We can
directly examine the votes from both EP6 and EP7 that our
model estimates to have high crisis-relevant probabilities (p^j).
Table A1 (tables A1–A6 available online) presents the titles
of the top 20 crisis-relevant texts from the 29 topic model,
from both parliamentary terms.22 As expected, the classiﬁ-
cation procedure successfully recovers the explicitly crisis-
related votes from EP7. Many of the well-known economic21. In ﬁg. A3 we present the three ﬁt statistics for all 98 models.
22. An equivalent table, for the 62 topic model, is given in app. sec. A8.
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ropean Semester—feature in the EP7 list. The EP6 votes—
which occurred before the crisis—are also all directly related
to the issues that became increasingly signiﬁcant after 2008.
Votes relating to the strengthening of national budgetary
positions, public ﬁnances, ﬁnancial markets, credit rating
agencies, and the common currency all feature prominently at
the top of the EP6 list. The procedure is not simply picking up
votes from late 2008 and early 2009 in EP6, as several of the
vote titles include the year inwhich theywere voted upon, and
they cover the whole of the EP6 period.23 In general, these
results suggest that our classiﬁcation procedure works re-
markably well, and that our synthetic control group is a rea-
sonable basis for comparison.
In addition, if our procedure is successfully identifying
crisis-relevant summaries, then the coefﬁcient estimates
from the ﬁrst-stage models will also be informative, as we
would expect those topics relating to ﬁnancial and eco-
nomic affairs to be strongly associated with our key phrase
search classiﬁcation in EP7. Figure A6 (ﬁgs. A1–A8 available
online), which presents the estimated ﬁrst-stage coefﬁcients
for the topic proportions from the 29 topic model alongside
their associated topic labels,24 conﬁrms this expectation: the
two topics that are most predictive of our key phrase search
classiﬁcation (i.e., those with the largest positive coefﬁcients
in the ﬁrst stage) are “econom;ﬁnanci;member;state” and
“ﬁnanci;credit;bank;author.”
Throughout the analysis we use the crisis-relevant ﬁtted
values for both EP6 and EP7 votes, rather than relying on
the discrete categorization for EP7 that is produced by our
key phrase search. There are two rationales for doing this.
First, simply for comparability between the two periods: if
we are using ﬁtted values in EP6 we should also do so in
EP7 to minimize differential measurement error. Second,
although the key phrase search provides a quick classiﬁ-
cation of crisis relevance, it is unlikely to perfectly separate
crisis-relevant legislation from non-crisis-relevant legisla-
tion, even within the crisis period. If an EP7 summary does
not explicitly mention any of the phrases we include in the
search, it will be counted as irrelevant to the crisis. Thus,
for example, even if the subject matter of the legislation is
tightly connected to matters of ﬁnance, banking, and eco-
nomic governance, if our search terms are absent from the
summary, our search will return a false negative—a sum-23. Figure A7 shows that our text model recovers crisis-related votes
across the entire time period but, reassuringly, records a peak in crisis-
relevant legislation in 2011–12.
24. The topic labels are constituted of the of the top four highest
probability words characterizing each topic.
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should also be concerned by false-positive results returned
by such a search. For example, a legislative summary may
include one of the phrases we include in our search but
only be tangentially related to the economic crisis that we
wish to study.
Our topic-modeling procedure helps to overcome these
difﬁculties, as we treat the classiﬁcation provided by the key
phrase search as training data for discovering the topics
that are generally associated with our crisis search terms.
These training data we have are noisy (because of the po-
tential for false-negative and false-positive classiﬁcations),
but by regressing the key phrase search classiﬁcation on the
topic proportions for each summary produced by our topic
models we are able to identify the topics that are consistently
associated with crisis legislation. Our approach therefore
uses the manual coding as a way of ﬁnding features (topics)
that are common across many different possible crisis-related
legislation texts.
Table A3 shows that the summaries that have high ﬁtted
values from the topic model analysis but lack the key phrases
used in our binary classiﬁcation include several high-proﬁle
pieces of crisis legislation, while those which have low ﬁtted
values but have those phrases are indeed weakly related to
the crisis, which demonstrates the beneﬁts of using the topic
proportions to produce ﬁtted values of crisis relevance. This
validity check further justiﬁes moving beyond a simple key
phrase search to deﬁne our treatment and control groups. A
key phrase search is impossible in the precrisis period, as
no legislative summary could make explicit mention of the
crisis before the crisis occurred. Our topic-model classiﬁer
allows us to compare the voting coalitions that form on
legislation on thematically similar topics both before and after
the crisis commenced. In addition, even within the crisis pe-
riod there is good reason to prefer the text-based classiﬁer over
a simple search for key phrases.25. Our second-stage model (eq. [7]) shares similarities with “leads and
lags” models that are commonly used in difference-in-differences designs
(Autor 2003). In addition to allowing us to understand how voting coalitions
changed over time during the treatment period, this speciﬁcation also pro-
vides an opportunity for us to assess whether voting coalitions on crisis-
relevant and non-crisis-relevant legislation were trending differently before
the onset of the crisis. Reassuringly, we ﬁnd no evidence for this.
26. Our ﬁrst stage does not aim to identify a nonendogenous com-
ponent of the variation in the treatment variable (crisis vs. noncrisis) but
rather to impute treatment for the half of our data where we cannot ob-
serve it (EP6).
27. Table A4 presents the full results from the regression.Differences-in-differences results
Having selected the best ﬁtting ﬁrst-stage model, we use the
ﬁtted values of crisis relevance as explanatory variables in a
second-stage linear regression of the following form:
jφj(d)jpot (at 1 bt ⋅ It ⋅ p^ j(d))1 εj(d); ð7Þ
where φ is the angle of the cutline, It is an indicator variable
for whether the vote was taken during a given period t, and
p^j is the ﬁtted value for the crisis relevance of the vote.
Because we are using ﬁtted values for whether the vote was
crisis-related, the coefﬁcients bt remain estimators of the
difference between the MAAD of crisis-related (p^p 1) andThis content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms non-crisis-related (p^p 0) votes in that period. Our primary
quantities of interest are therefore the bt but also the ﬁtted
values for non-crisis-related votes at and for crisis-related
votes at 1 bt . The theoretical model directly implies that
the ﬁtted values for crisis-related votes should decline once
the crisis begins, indicating increasingly pro-versus-anti in-
tegration coalitions, rather than left-versus-right coalitions.
We also expect to see that decline in the values of the bt di-
rectly, indicating a shift relative to non-crisis-relevant votes,
as evidence against the possibility that some general shift in
voting is occurring across all domains.25
This approach, which is an unusual application of a two-
stage least squares estimator,26 has two attractive features.
First, using the legislative summary texts ensures that we
are comparing thematically or topically similar votes across
the entire period. This means that if there had always been a
difference between how the EP voted on the issues that ulti-
mately become crisis-related and other issues, we will observe
a constant difference over time. Second, using the ﬁtted values
for crisis-relatedness for both EP6 and EP7, rather than using
the binary coding for EP7, enables a fairer comparison of the
two periods.
As votes ( j) are grouped within texts (d ), and the topic
mixtures vary only at that group level, a block bootstrap is
needed to account for within-text error correlation in the
ﬁrst-stagemodel (Angrist and Pischke 2008, 315).We jointly
bootstrap both regression stages 1,000 times, resampling the
texts with replacement, and estimating our quantities of in-
terest at each iteration.
Figure 3 presents the ﬁtted values for crisis-relevant and
non-crisis-relevant votes (left panel), and the bt coefﬁcients
(right panel) from equation (7).27 The ﬁgure shows that crisis-
related votes in EP6 and the ﬁrst year of EP7 (June 9, 2009, to
June 8, 2010) were characterized by voting coalitions that were
somewhatmore left-right than other votes. However, once the
political response to the crisis begins in earnest in the middle
of 2010, crisis-related votes become more pro-anti than be-
fore, and than all other votes occurring at the same time on41.061.032 on June 26, 2018 06:41:13 AM
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(depicted in gray in the left panel of ﬁg. 3) are essentially ﬂat
across the study period, suggesting that any change in voting
behavior occurred only on crisis-relevant issues.
While the conﬁdence intervals of our bt coefﬁcients over-
lap with zero in later years, the point estimates are negative
throughout the crisis-period and clearly indicate a change to
the voting coalitions on crisis-relevant votes when compared
to the precrisis period. In table A5, we simplify the analysis by
comparing voting coalitions on crisis-relevant and non-crisis-
relevant votes using two binary codings for the crisis period
(rather than the yearly approach we take here). We ﬁrst treat
the crisis period as EP7 versus EP6, and second as post-2010
versus pre-2010. In both speciﬁcations, the b coefﬁcient we
estimate is strongly statistically signiﬁcant and substantively
large. In further speciﬁcations presented in table A5, we
control for whether a given vote was an amendment or a ﬁnal
passage vote, and for the legislative procedure under which
the vote was taken.28 In addition, in appendix section A13, we
present the main results from allK topic model speciﬁcations.
Regardless of the model speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that voting
coalitions on crisis-relevant legislation during the crisis period
are signiﬁcantly more pro-anti than are those for non-crisis-
relevant legislation, relative to the same difference in the
noncrisis period.28. The EP adopts legislation under a variety of different legislative
procedures.
This content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Recall that the purpose of creating the synthetic control
comparison using EP6 was to rule out the possibility that the
kinds of issues that became crisis-relevant had always ex-
hibited relatively pro-anti voting coalitions, even before the
crisis. The estimates here suggest otherwise: pro-integration
coalitions formed more frequently on crisis-related votes in
the post-crisis period relative to non-crisis-related votes, but
the opposite was true in the precrisis period. Overall, these
results indicate that the coalition structure of voting in the
European Parliament changed meaningfully after the onset of
the ﬁnancial crisis in those issue areas that the crisis affected,
but not other issue areas. This is what we expected to observe
if pro-integration agenda setters were able to exploit the crisis
in order to pass integrationist policy that would previously
have failed to win a majority of support.Threats to inference
One concern with the above analysis is that the change ob-
served in voting behavior could be the result of factors other
than the crisis. In particular, two alternative explanations
deserve attention. First, changing voting behavior could be
the result of a change to the composition of the Parliament
after the European elections in 2009. The EP became more
fragmented after the election, with smaller parties winning
seats from the larger parties, with the implication that fewer
pro-integration MEPs were elected. This fragmentation may
have lead to more “grand coalition” votes, where the largeFigure 3. Left, Estimates of the mean absolute angular deviation in crisis-relevant versus non-crisis-relevant votes, for each year in EP6 and EP7 (starting
June 9th of the labeled year, to align with the 2009 European Parliament elections). Right, Differences between crisis-relevant and non-crisis-relevant votes
over the same period.41.061.032 on June 26, 2018 06:41:13 AM
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mentary strength (Hix 2009).
Second, the European Parliament changed the rules gov-
erning which roll-call votes were recorded in EP7. Previ-
ously, roll-call votes were recorded only when requested by
a political group or one-tenth of the MEPs, meaning that
roll-calls were called on approximately one-third of all votes
(Carrubba et al. 2006; Hix 2009). However, from June 2009
and the start of EP7, all ﬁnal legislative votes were auto-
matically taken by roll-call. The effects of roll-call selection
in the European Parliament are unclear (Carrubba et al.
2006; Muehlboeck and Yordanova 2012), but it is possible
that this change could result in increasingly pro-anti vot-
ing coalitions. For example, if roll-call votes had previously
been avoided on ﬁnal votes that were supported by a pro-
integration coalition, then the rule change would possibly
have resulted in increased observations of pro-integration
coalitions (and thus lower MAAD scores) in EP7.
While we are unable to entirely discount these alterna-
tive explanations that involve the EP6/EP7 changeover, two
aspects of our results do not ﬁt with these alternatives. First,
we observe a shift in voting behavior one year after the
changeover, in 2010 rather than 2009. Second, if either the
electoral explanation or the rule change explanation were
true, we would expect to observe decreasing MAAD scores
across all policy areas rather than just those related to the
crisis. The logic of these arguments is that there was some
structural or institutional change that affected the entire
parliament in 2009, but our analysis uncovers signiﬁcant
change in voting behavior only on crisis-relevant issues. As
ﬁgure 3 makes clear, there is essentially no change in the
average cutline on non-crisis-relevant votes between the
two parliaments. Any alternative explanation for our ﬁnd-
ings must explain the change in behavior over time, the fact
that change occurs only in crisis-related votes, and the fact
that the change occurred one year after the new parliament
began, when the crisis became acute.
A possible objection to the theoretical framing that we
have provided for our analysis is that the crisis did not
affect the valence of the status quo, but rather inﬂuenced
the spatial elements of legislators’ utility by making MEPs
more favorable to increased integration. To account for the
fact that observed changes are only in crisis-related policy
areas, it would need to be the case that the crisis changed
preferences of MEPs in just those areas, which is possible if
you take the view that the crisis speciﬁcally signaled a need
for more integration in only those policy areas. As discussed
in our theoretical section, and in section A9 of the appendix,
this argument is plausible, but not necessarily incompatible
with our own. Both spatial and nonspatial crisis models inThis content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms this context engage with the idea that the crisis somehow
changed the incentives to integrate for MEPs. We think it
makesmore sense to think about the valence of existing policy,
rather than the spatial preferences of legislators for integra-
tion, being differentially affected by the crisis, and so we un-
derstand the crisis to affect voting behavior through the non-
spatial component of utility. In general, however, the most
interesting theoretical implications of both our story and the
changing preferences story focus on the same counterfactual.
Under either account, the primary dimension of conﬂict in the
EP shifted toward pro-anti votes in crisis-relevant areas and
policies were passed following the ﬁnancial crisis that would
not have passed in the absence of the crisis.
CONCLUSION
When José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European
Commission, gave his State of the Union speech to the Eu-
ropean Parliament in 2013, he argued that, “If we look back
and think about what we have done together to unite Europe
throughout the crisis, I think it is fair to say that we would
never have thought all this possible ﬁve years ago” (Barroso
2013). The degree of integration in ﬁnancial and economic
affairs following the crisis was indeed unprecedented, and the
argument we have made here is that these policies succeeded
because the crisis strengthened the position of pro-integration
agenda-setting actors (including Mr. Barroso). Such signiﬁ-
cant increases in EU competences might not have occurred in
the absence of a crisis.
More generally, our model provides microfoundations for
the intuition that crises represent “opportunities to be ex-
ploited” by industrious agenda setters in the legislative pro-
cess. Exogenous shocks decrease the efﬁcacy of existing policy
in the context of changing real world conditions, and make
status quo policies less attractive to all legislators. Because
legislators want to replace deﬁcient policy, those with pro-
posal power are able to secure outcomes that would be im-
possible without a crisis. In contrast to previous literature on
crises, we demonstrated how a speciﬁc impediment to reform
is reduced by exogenous shocks, and also provided predic-
tions about the direction of policy movement during crisis
periods which have empirically observable implications for
voting patterns which we were able to test.
In the case we examine, pro-integration actors hold the
major agenda-setting powers pertaining to ﬁnancial regulation,
and thus in this crisis we expected to observe policy moving
toward a more integrationist position. However, given a dif-
ferent distribution of agenda-setting preferences, our model
would produce different predictions for the direction of policy
movement in the event of a crisis. For example, the unprec-
edented increase in migrants arriving in Europe since 201441.061.032 on June 26, 2018 06:41:13 AM
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Pro-integration actors have the power to initiate legislation
pertaining to migration at the EU level, and the European
Commission has drafted legislative proposals that would
create a new common border force equipped with powers to
overrule national authorities (Commission 2015). However,
support for the Commission’s proposal is limited amongst
member state governments, implying that the agenda-setting
power of pro-integration actors is diluted in the area of mi-
gration. The relatively equal distribution of proposal powers
between EU and national levels will have consequences for the
policies that are adopted in response to this crisis. In this case,
although there is increasing dissatisfaction with status quo
policies, because agenda-setters are not united by common
integrationist preferences and proposal powers are diffuse,
reforms to border protection policies are likely to be less in-
tegrationist than were the reforms to economic policy in the
post-ﬁnancial crash world. As partial evidence in support of
this view, several countries within the Schengen free-movement
area have recently reintroduced national border controls in an
attempt to curb the number of migrants.
Our model may also be a useful heuristic for understand-
ing the legislative effects of other crises, particularly when
preexisting policy disagreement is multidimensional. For ex-
ample, in 1957, Lyndon Johnson, then US Senate majority
leader and a powerful agenda setter, recognized that the civil
rights bill proposed by President Eisenhower was likely to be
ﬁlibustered by the Senate southern Democrats. The opposi-
tion of these legislators was a signiﬁcant constraint on exec-
utive action and forced Johnson to admit amendments that
signiﬁcantly weakened the enforcement of the bill (Jeong, Mil-
ler, and Sened 2009). By 1964, however, Johnson, now presi-
dent, was able to pass the more robust Civil Rights Act. It is
commonly accepted that the racial tensions of the early 1960s
gave momentum to the civil rights movement and offered
Johnson a window of opportunity in which to pass reform
(Keeler 1993, 462). One reading of this is that legislators’
preferences shifted toward wanting civil rights legislation, but
ourmodel indicates that themarginal legislators could instead
have simply recognized that the status-quo was increasingly
untenable. As a pro-civil rights agenda setter, Johnson was
able to pass reforms that had previously proved intractable in
the legislature, shifting patterns of voting toward a north-
south dimension during this period (Poole and Rosenthal
2011, 141–42). Our model has an important implication for
the counterfactual: what policies might have been successfully
advanced by an anti-civil rights president in the context of
the diverse events of the early 1960s, from the “March on
Washington” to the Birmingham church bombing? Civil rights
legislation might now seem like the obvious policy response,This content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms but there is no shortage of historical crises that have been
exploited by political agenda setters to achieve less righteous
ends. The kinds of crises we model facilitate shifts in any
policy direction.
A further theoretical implication is that strategic agenda
setters may have an incentive to exaggerate crisis severity
in order to maximize their discretion over policy outcomes.
There are anecdotal suggestions that certain EU institu-
tions behaved in this manner during the ﬁnancial crisis. For
example, the bond-buying policy of the European Central
Bank (ECB) enabled indebted governments to secure enough
liquidity to stave off immediate sovereign default but stopped
short of providing a blank check which would have funda-
mentally reassured nervous market actors. Although not itself
an agenda-setting actor, the ECB’s piecemeal strategy al-
lowed other pro-integration actors such as the Commission
to put additional pressure on national leaders and MEPs to
agree to reforms of the Eurozone’s institutional architecture.
As one observer argues, “The central bank cannot directly
compel democratically elected leaders to comply with its wishes,
but it can refuse to bail their countries out and thereby permit
the crisis to pressure them to act” (Bergsten 2012). In short,
by emphasizing the deﬁciencies of existing policy, and exag-
gerating the likely future trajectory of a crisis, agenda-setting
actors can cajole decision makers into passing the policies
that they propose. While this logic suggests strong incentives
for agenda-setters to exaggerate crisis-severity, their ability to
do so will be limited by the credibility of their claims with
legislators, the public, and the press.
We describe how crises enable agenda setters to overcome
legislative opposition to policy change, but there is no explicit
role for voters in our model. An enrichment of the model
would be to make legislators subject to voter pressure. How-
ever, for this to make a difference to the power of the agenda-
setter, voters would have to respond to crises by sanctioning
some courses of action whilst prohibiting others. More likely,
we believe, is that voters’ main desire is for politicians to “get
something done” in the face of a crisis, thus endowing agenda-
setting actors with a public mandate that reinforces the leg-
islative mandate they gain in our model. If anything, this will
further discourage legislators from voting for the status-quo.
As Keeler (1993, 441) argues, a sense of public urgency “may
serve to override . . . caution . . . and allows for unusually rapid
and uncritical acceptance of reform proposals intended to re-
solve the crisis.” This urgency therefore makes the electorate
more permissive of policy proposals and so reinforces agenda-
setters’ discretion. The incorporation of electoral effects into
our model may well serve to reinforce the central implication
that agenda setters beneﬁt, regardless of what they aim to use
the crisis to accomplish.41.061.032 on June 26, 2018 06:41:13 AM
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